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ALJ Final Orders on Appeal: Balancing Independence
With Accountability
By: Jim Rossi*
Independence is not the same as accountability.I Independence
requires insulation and neutrality. A decision can be independent even
though it is not supported by an explanation. Independence, ipso facto,
eschews any type of external oversight or control. An accountable
decision, however, requires a shared explanation, reason or
justification. Judicial courts, for instance, enhance accountability
through the reasoning in their written decisions or, in the case of
appellate panels, through collaboration and interchange of ideas. In
addition, when we evaluate the legitimacy of administrative agencies,
we often value political accountability; for some issues, we forgo high
degrees of insulation and neutrality, subjecting agency decisions to
external oversights and controls to ensure that they reflect the will of
the executive branch or the legislature.
In this paper, I argue that a system of judicial review of
administrative decisions needs to protect both independence and
accountability, including some notion of political accountability. As a
practical matter, I suggest that standards of review provide courts with
a way of balancing independence and accountability - especially
political accountability - in the agency decisionmaking process. When
independence and accountability converge in the lower decisionmaker,
a reviewing court should defer to the final decision below. However,
when the two diverge between different decisionmakers below, a
reviewing court must decide between less deference or choose to whom
'C 1999, Jim Rossi. Patricia A. Dore Associate Professor of State Administrative
Procedure, Florida State University College of Law. 425 W. Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL
32306. 850/644-83081 jrossi@law.fsu.edu. Thanks to participants in the National Association
of Administrative Law Judges 1999 Annual Meeting in Asheville, North Carolina, where I
presented a version of this paper. Thanks also to Steven Bank, Scott Boyd, and Natalie Futch
for their comments on a previous draft.
"'[W]hile we want judges to be independent so that they can administer the law
without fear of reprisal, we also want to find some way of controlling them." David P. Currie,
SeparatingJudicialPower, 61 LAW & CONTEMV. PROB. 7 (1998) (contribution to symposium,
JudicialIndependence and Accountability).
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to defer. If in reviewing agency action courts choose to whom to defer,
they should defer to the politically accountable decisionmaker except
where the issue is one of fact depending on the credibility of witnesses
and other evidence.
Here I develop this thesis in the context of a movement towards
enhancing the final order authority of state central panel administrative
law judge (ALJ) and hearing officer orders, a trend that has potential to
transform the administrative judiciary into a full-fledged administrative
court. Although there are many benefits to ALJ finality, among them
enhanced independence, in this paper I suggest that it also risks
undermining core executive branch functions and thwarting
accountability norms. Reviewing courts can restore accountability
without sacrificing independence by paying attention to the standards
of review they apply to ALJ final orders.
In part I, I describe how, following the proliferation of central
panels, many states have increasingly given ALJ orders de jure or de
facto finality by taking away an agency's opportunity to review ALJ
decisions or requiring agencies to accept ALJ findings unless the
agency overcomes a fairly rigorous evidentiary or reasoning burden.
ALJ finality, whether de jure or de facto, has many benefits, among
them independence of decisionmaking, enhanced efficiency, and
accuracy. Despite these benefits, in part II I argue that, while it is
difficult to generalize across the states, the trend towards finality is
troubling under traditional notions of separation of powers. ALJ
finality risks undermining core executive branch functions, and thus
runs counter to separation of powers and accountability norms. Despite
these accountability problems with increased finality of some ALJ
decisions, states courts have generally avoided addressing the
constitutionality of ALJ finality.2
In part III, I suggest that the best way for reviewing courts to
2

As the U.S. Supreme Court has avoided addressing the constitutionality of the U.S.
Tax Court. Cf Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the ProposalAdvanced by
the Federal CourtsStudy Committee: A Study ofApplied ConstitutionalTheory, 76 CoRN. L.
REV. 985 (1991) (arguing that the Tax Court raises serious Article III problems, but that the
Supreme Court has avoided and will continue to avoid the issue).
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correct the accountability deficiency with ALJ finality is to apply
different judicial standards of review to ALJ final orders than agency
final orders. With regards to issues of fact, independence and
accountability converge in the ALJ so the rationales for deference to the
ALJ are strongest, although the argument for a substantial evidence test
is perhaps weaker than in other administrative review contexts. With
issues of policy and law, however, the independent decisionmaker and
the politically accountable decisionmaker diverge. To the extent
accountability is also important in deciding issues of law and policy,
courts should generally defer to the accountable decisionmaker. I
recommend that reviewing courts give great weight to agency policy
decisions and interpretations of law, despite ALJ order finality; in other
words, to enhance accountability, reviewing courts should heighten the
deference they give to the agency's legal and policy positions - giving
little or no deference to the ALJ on these issues - even where the AL's
decision is regarded as final.
I.

The Trend Toward Increased ALJ Finality

The federal APA and 1981 Model State APA (MSAPA) grant
agencies de jure authority to consider ALJ "recommended" orders or
decisions. Many state legislatures, however, have given ALJs "final"
authority to decide a range of issues, from factual disputes to issues of
policy and law. There are many advantages to enhanced ALJ finality,
among them independence of decisionmaking, efficiency, and accuracy.
Some states provide for de jure finality, making ALJ orders directly
appealable to the courts without providing an intervening opportunity
for agency review. Others provide for de facto finality, elevating the
agency standard of review of ALJ decisions to level that effectively
cloaks the ALJ decision with a presumption of correctness.
A.

Three Conceptual Models of ALJ Adjudication

There are three distinct models of ALJ adjudication leading to
judicial review. Following Professor William Anderson, I divide the
models into the "internal," the "mixed" (traditional central panel) and
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the "external" (central panel final order).3 They are summarized in the
diagram below.
THREE MODELS OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING
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Model I, the "internal" model, views the AU as operating
entirely within the agency. For example, if a regulatory matter involves
an investigation and decision to prosecute, when a hearing is requested
under Model I an AU within the agency decides the relevant issues of
fact and law. Following issuance of the AL's decision, the agency
head is given an opportunity to review the AL's findings of fact and
law. The agency head takes the final agency action, or the action that
is appealable to and reviewable by a court. So, in applying the internal
model, a reviewing court evaluates the agency head's reaction to an
agency AU. The agency may have accepted the AL's order or
allowed the time for rejecting or modifying the AL's order to pass, but
the agency has the opportunity to reject or modify the AL's proposed
findings of fact and law.

'The classification and diagram are adapted from William R. Anderson, Judicial
Review of State AdministrativeAction - Designing the Statutory Framework,44 ADMIN. L.
REv. 523, 555 (1992).
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Under Model II, the traditional central panel model that many
states employ, when a hearing is requested the matter is referred to an
ALJ or hearing officer housed in a central panel outside of the
administrative agency. The traditional central panel ALJ, like the
internal ALJ, decides the relevant issues of fact and law, and the agency
is then given an opportunity to consider the ALJ's recommended
decision. As with the internal model, the agency, not the ALJ, takes
final agency action. Thus, this model is "mixed," in that the final
agency decision is a reaction to a non-agency ALJ. Here too, the
reviewing court is evaluating an agency head's evaluation of an ALJ's
order, albeit a non-agency ALJ. Although the ALJ under Model II may
not necessarily possess as much expertise on technical issues as an ALJ
under Model I, similar standards of review generally apply.
Under Model III, the ALJ is external in both form and function.
The external model gives central panel ALJs the authority to issue final,
not just recommended, orders. Although the central panel ALJ decides
similar issues of fact and law, the agency has no legal opportunity to
react to the ALJ's decision prior to appeal. Following the ALJ's
decision, the matter is immediately appealable to a reviewing court. In
contrast to Models I and II, under Model III the agency effectively
submits to binding arbitration before the ALJ. Many state
administrative law systems endorse this third model, although they do
so in different contexts and to varied degrees. Even where the third
model is not expressly present, modifying the presumptions applicable
to agency review of ALJ orders may transform a central panel's ALJ
decisions into de facto final decisions.
While accounts of the first and second models are well
established, there is little discussion of the third model in the literature.
Yet, this third model prevails in many states, most predominantly in
Florida, South Carolina, Missouri and Louisiana. It exists in both de
jure and de facto forms.
B.

The Benefits of Enhanced Finality

ALJ final order authority has several advantages over other
adjudication models, among them increased independence, efficiency
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and accuracy.
Since with ALJ final order authority the agency does not have
an opportunity to consider the ALJ's recommendations prior to appeal,
ALJ finality protects independence better than Models I and II, each of
which allows the agency an opportunity to take issue with the ALJ.
Where an ALJ's factual or legal findings depart from the initial agency
decision, the agency may be tempted to find a way to depart from the
ALJ decision, especially where the agency's legal or policy agenda is
at issue. The ALJ is a more independent decisionmaker than the
agency, and thus the ALJ's decision will provide a reviewing court a
more independent document for evaluation than an agency decision.
There is also an efficiency rationale for vesting finality with the
ALJ. With respect to many issues, especially issues of fact, the AL's
decision will reflect the result of an impartial evidentiary hearing, so
allowing the agency an opportunity to modify the ALJ's findings
introduces an inefficiency, especially if the agency is required to
reevaluate some or all the evidence previously presented before the
AL. ALJ final order authority enhances efficiency, by allowing the
agency to focus on other cases rather than a matter in which an ALJ has
already adjudicated the disputed issues. It also avoids needless
duplication of evaluation of the record and other evidence.
In addition, where the ALJ is adjudicating programs with clear
and precise statutory or regulatory criteria, ALJ final order authority
enhances accuracy in decisionmaking. Since in an evidentiary hearing
the ALJ will examine all the evidence, the ALJ is more likely to apply
criteria without taking into account other regulatory or policy goals, as
the agency might. If accuracy in the context of limited and predefined
goals is a goal of the regulatory program, the ALJ's decision may be
just as effective in pursuing this goal as the agency's.
C.

De Jure Finality

Some state APAs provide that ALJ or hearing officer decisions
are final, in the sense that they give agencies no legal opportunity to
review the ALJ order and take action prior to appeal. While I have not

Fall 1999

Aid Final Orders on Appeal

conducted a comprehensive survey of all state APAs, the phenomenon
of ALJ order appears in more than just a few states.
Florida is one such state and, as the state in which I teach, it
sparked my intrigue in the phenomenon. For example, in Florida,
ALJ's issue final orders in challenges to administrative rules.4 In this
context, an AU operates in part as a hearing officer overseeing what is
akin to a "formal" notice and comment rulemaking. Procedurally, with
a rule challenge before an ALJ, rulemaking is transformed into
litigation regarding whether a rule is an "invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority." While similar to a formal notice and comment
rulemaking proceeding in our federal system - in the sense that an
adjudicative record is developed during a hearing over which an AU
presides - AU rule challenges in Florida involve a broader range of
factual and legal inquiries. In a rule challenge proceeding, an AU
makes legal determinations regarding the statutory authority for a rule
and whether a rule is arbitrary and capricious.' In rule challenge
proceedings, the AU's decisions regarding the receipt of evidence,
statutory interpretation, and the arbitrary and capriciousness of the rule.
The agency is bound to the ALJ's decision regarding issues of law and
policy, since the decision is final and immediately appealable to a midlevel appellate court.6
In South Carolina, ALJs also play the role of the first level
appeal of agency action, rendering final and immediately appealable
decisions on a variety of issues. ALJs render final decisions in cases
between a party and an agency where the agency has a single director.7
The South Carolina approach effectively treats the central panel
decisions like those of an administrative court. This follows the model
4

See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 120.56 (1999).
"Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" is defined in Fla. Stat.

§ 120.52(8). It includes not only procedural flaws in the rulemaking process, such as failure
to comply with APA requirements and arbitrary and capriciousness, but also several

substantive grounds, such as lack of statutory authority and failure to adopt a less costly
alternative to the rule.
6

See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 120.56(1)(e) (in rule challenges, "the administrative law judge's
order shall be final agency action.").
7
See William B. Swent, South Carolina'sAL: CentralPanel,Administrative Court,
or a Little of Both, 48 S.C. L. REv. 1 (1996).
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endorsed in Missouri, where orders of its Administrative Hearing
Commission in non-licensing cases are immediately appealable.'
Louisiana has also recently amended its APA, allowing ALJ's the
authority to issue final and immediately appealable orders and
precluding any agency opportunity to reject or modify ALJ orders on
issues of fact, law and policy.'
Other state systems afford ALJs or hearing officers final order
authority too, although often this occurs outside of a central panel
system."0 California considers central panel ALJ decisions final in
cases regarding services for the developmentally disabled, such as
audiology, and in cases involving discharge of tenured school teachers,
in which the ALJ sits as a member of a 3-person panel." Other states
reporting final decisionmaking authority by central panels include:
Colorado (Workers Compensation, Social Services); Maryland (Motor
Vehicles, Human Resources, Personnel, Education); Massachusetts
(Retirement Board, Rate Setting Commission, Veterans Benefits,
Contract Disputes); Minnesota (Workers Compensation, Human
Rights, Child Support); New Jersey (Special Education); North
Carolina (Teacher Certification); Tennessee (Health, Environment,
Commerce & Insurance); Washington (Special Education); Wisconsin
(Natural Resources, Corrections, Health & Social Services); and
Wyoming (Workers Compensation, Drivers' License).' 2 In North
'Mo. Ann. Stat. §621.189 (1988).
9
Louisiana's amended APA states: "In an adjudication commenced by the division,
the administrative law judge shall issue the final decision or order, whether or not on rehearing,
and the agency shall have no authority to override such decision or order." La. R.S.
49:992(B)(2). For discussion of the Louisiana amendments, see Jay S. Bybee, Agency
Expertise, ALIJ Independence, and Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana's
Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REv. 431 (1999).
"Sometimes, as Julian Mann suggested to me at the NAALJ conference, states grant
ALJ final order authority with the approval - or at the suggestion - of federal agencies that
oversee state regulatory programs. Federal regulators may value independence over political
accountability within a state on certain issues, such as the implementation of federal human
rights, welfare, environmental, and educational programs.
"Email from Michael Asimow, Professor of Law at UCLA, to Jim Rossi, Apr. 28,
1999 (on file with author). In addition, in-house ALJs in California have final order authority
in certain cases, including welfare cases. Id.
"John W. Hardwicke, The CentralHearing Agency: Theory and Implementation in
Maryland, 14 J.NAALJ 5, 84 (1994) (1994 survey by author). Recent results from a survey
conducted by Edward J. Schoenbaum for the National Conference of Administrative Law
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Carolina, elevating ALJ decisions to final orders was the topic of a
recent reform proposal before its Legislature, but this was not adopted
into law. 3
D.

De Facto Finality

In many states, ALJ decisions can become final if the agency
does not reject or modify them within a specified time period.
However, since the agency has the opportunity to make its own
judgement on the ALJ decision, these systems do not provide for de
facto finality, except in a very weak sense. In practice, agencies may
modify or reject few ALJ decisions, but so long agencies have the
discretion to do so there is no strong de facto finality built into the
agency's review of the ALJ.
Yet some states go further, endorsing a strong form of de facto
finality. Although an agency may have an opportunity to review the
AL's findings, a state's APA may impose legal presumptions that, in
effect, make the AL's recommendations final. An agency may be
unable to reject the AL's findings, except in the rarest circumstances
and only after overcoming a fairly rigorous burden.
Florida is a good example of a state where de facto finality
applies as a matter of course to ALJ findings of fact. In Florida, even
where an agency has the opportunity to evaluate an AL's
recommended order (routinely the case in adjudication proceedings), an
agency's ability to reject ALJ findings is seriously limited. For
example, with respect to findings of fact, a Florida agency may only
reject the AL's findings where "[t]he agency first determines from a
review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order,
that the findings of fact were not based on competent substantial
evidence.
,,14 At the same time, "Rejection or modification of
Judges - Judicial Division, American Bar Association reports several other states with final
ALJ order authority. See Schoenbaum draft results of survey, dated June 6, 1999 (on file with

author).
3
See Bill Would Make Handling of Complaint Appeals Fairer to Residents,
ASHEVILLE CrIZEN-TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1999, at B 1.
4
' Fla. Stat. Ann. § 120.57(l) (1999).
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conclusions of law may not form the basis for rejection or modification
of findings of fact."' 5 Practically, this may mean that an agency is
bound by the AL's characterization of fact and law and an agency can
reject findings of fact only after making its own independent
assessment of all of the evidence in the record. Presumptively, then,
the ALJ's findings of fact are final, and the burden is on the agency to
overcome this presumption. Montana follows a similar approach.' 6
II.

Sacrificing Accountability for Independence

Despite its benefits ALJ finality also has some significant costs.
Primarily, AU finality risks thwarting agency accountability, leaving
law and policy decisions in the hands of ALJs. Since most ALJs
operate as merit appointees, not subject to the same political
accountability constraints as agency heads, the result of AU final order
authority may be less political accountability for agency
decisionmaking.
The Supreme Court has struggled to identify which adjudicative
functions must remain in the courts, which may be placed in the
executive branch, and which must be placed in the executive branch.
Yet, the cases are decidedly unhelpful in addressing whether delegation
of final order authority to an AU outside of a politically accountable
agency is constitutional. The closest analogy to bolstering the status of
a central panel to that of trial court is the establishment of the tax and
bankruptcy courts in the federal system. In both instances, however,
the courts are provided a higher degree of separation from the executive
branch than most state central panels.
At least one state, Florida, has held that final authority by an
AU located in a central panel does not violate state separation of
powers doctrine. A Florida appellate court upheld its Division of
Administrative Hearings' authority to issue final orders in rule
challenge proceedings. The court rejected a constitutional challenge to
AU final order authority, reasoning that the text of Florida's
15Id.

16 Mont. Code Ann. §2-4-621.
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Constitution recognizes the power of the legislature to place quasijudicial functions in a board or agency.' 7 While the court based its
decision on constitutional text, it did not address an alternative
functional argument: whether giving ALJ's the authority to issue final
adjudicative decisions undermines core executive branch functions
considered essential to accountability under separation of powers
norms.
Functional analysis is indeterminate, but it does provide a useful
framework for analyzing how well state administrative procedure
mechanisms and reforms respect separation of power norms. Basically,
a functional analysis of the problem will ask whether a legislative grant
of power to an institution within a system of government somehow
undermines the core powers of another branch of government.
The delegation of adjudicative authority to ALJs probably does
not per se undermine the core functions of the executive branch.
However, to the extent that a legislature has delegated to a central panel
the authority to adjudicate issues of law and policy without also
providing the agency an opportunity to review these findings, the core
powers of the executive branch are in danger.'" Among the core powers
in danger are the agency's responsibility to provide explanations for its
policy choices and the regulatory agency's responsibility to interpret
statutes where the legislature has delegated under an ambiguous grant

"Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. App. I Dist. 1977).
The court relied on Article V, Section 1 of Florida's Constitution, which states "Commission
established by law, or administrative officers or bodies may be granted qausi-judicial power
in matters connected with the functions of their offices." However, despite this court's
decision, a textual reading of separation of powers in Florida's Constitution could raise
problems for ALI finality. Article IV, Section 6 of Florida's Constitution states "The
administration of each [executive] department, unless otherwise provided in this constitution,
shall be placed by law under the direct supervision of the governor, the lieutenant governor,
the governor and cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer or board appointed by and serving
at the pleasure of the governor .... " The only function of DOAH, Florida's central panel, is
adjudication; but if adjudication is a plausible function for an executive office Article V,
Section 1 is meaningless. Moreover, as an independent adjudicative body, DOAH is not under
the direct political supervision of Florida's governor and cabinet.
'8Cf Bybee, supra note 9, at 462-63 (observing that introduction of central panel
final order authority in Louisiana poses potential separation of powers problems by depriving
the executive of its authority).
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of authority.
Although there is an argument that ALJ final order authority is
unconstitutional, under existing cases central panel ALJ final order
authority has been upheld. However, from a political accountability
perspective ALJ final order authority is troublesome, especially where
ALJs have the authority to decide issues of law and policy. By creating
a central panel independent of the agency with regulatory jurisdiction,
it splits the executive branch against itself under a guise of legitimacy.
However, since independence is not the same as accountability, where
issues of law and policy are at issue accountability may be sacrificed. 9
III.

Enhancing Accountability With Standards of Review

Since there are limits to APA-based appellate review
standards,20 appellate judges often will still need to decide how much
deference to apply in reviewing final ALJ orders. As Professor Michael
Asimow has observed, standards of review can be considered as one
way of protecting accountability in the agency decisionmaking
process. 2 ' Because of direct review of the AL's findings absent any
agency opportunity for evaluation, ALJ finality focuses attention on the
relationship between agency accountability and standards of review in
a way that the internal and traditional central panel models of judicial
review do not. This section argues that, properly applied, standards of
review can restore the constitutional balance that may be lost by the
increasing trend towards ALJ final order authority.

"gA constitutionally sounder approach than simply imposing finality on an executive
branch central panel might be transform an executive branch central panel to ajudicial branch
central panel. Maine has created an "Administrative Court," which has jurisdiction in licensee
discipline cases or where an agency refuses to issue or renew a license. In Maine, the
administrative court is a part of the state's Judicial Department. 4 Me. Rev. Stat. § 1151; 5 Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10051(1998). See Comment, The Questfor Justice in Maine Administrative
Procedure: The Administrative Code in Application and Theory, 18 ME. L. REV. 218, 224-25,
241-43 (1966). However, even under this approach, issues regarding the standard of review
for issues of law and policy, as are discussed below, arise.
2
John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in JudicialReview, 77 TEX. L. REV.

113 (1998).

2

Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California
Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1189-90 (1995).
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A.

Substantial Evidence

On issues of fact, independence and accountability are likely to
converge in the adjudicative decisionmaker, even where ALJs issue
final orders. On pure issues of witness credibility or other evidentiary
matters political accountability is least important. So long as there is
evidence in the record to support findings the ALJ is both independent
and accountable. Thus, on most issues of fact, the rationales for a
standard of review that is deferential to the ALJ will be strongest. For
this reason, de facto finality on issues of fact, as in Florida and
Montana, poses a relatively small threat to agency accountability.22
Traditionally, findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial
evidence test. This test is perhaps the most popular standard for
reviewing agency action. When courts use the substantial evidence test,
they invoke the same standard used by a federal court of appeals in
reviewing the findings of a jury.23 This is the standard that applies
under §706(2)(E) of the federal APA ("the reviewing court shall.., set
aside agency action, findings or conclusions . . . unsupported by
substantial evidence") and §5-116(c)(7) of the 1981 MSAPA (the court
shall grant relief only if it determines an agency's finding of fact "is not
supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court").
As standards of review go, substantial evidence is fairly
deferential. Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla," but it
is less than a preponderance of the evidence.24 Thus, in applying the
test, to uphold the lower tribunal all that must be shown is some
evidence supporting the decision. Under the test articulated in both the
federal APA and the 1981 MSAPA, the decision of the tribunal below
stands unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, suggesting that
a presumption of correctness is implicit to application of the substantial
'Florida's 1999 APA amendments also incorporate a weak type of de facto finality
on issues of law. See 1999 amendment to Fla. Stat. §120.57 (requiring an agency to follow the
AL's decision on issues of law or, if the agency reject's the ALl's interpretation, to state why
the agency interpretation is more reasonable).
"See Allentown v. Mack Sales & Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
24
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
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evidence test. One rationale for the level of deference implicit in the
substantial evidence test is that it preserves the fact-finding process
before the central panel AL. To the extent factual issues can be
resolved by credible witnesses and other evidence, the ALJ is the best
decisionmaker to make the presumptively correct factual findings. In
addition, there is an efficiency advantage to the substantial evidence
test, as it discourages disappointed litigants from unnecessary appeals,
thus saving judicial resources.
If we are concerned about accountability, however, substantial
evidence may be of limited utility in review of ALJ final orders. One
of the key rationales supporting the deferential substantial evidence test
is that agencies possess expertise and accountability in the areas they
regulate. Yet, since ALJs lack political accountability and do not
possess as much expertise as do agencies, this is not a very persuasive
reason for a court to apply a substantial evidence standard of review to
final decisions of a central panel ALJ - particularly where issues of law
or policy are at issue. As I argue below, to the extent that issues are
less the sort that can be resolved purely on the basis of credible
witnesses and other factual evidence, the substantial evidence test is an
inadequate standard of review for ALJ final orders.
B.

Clearly Erroneous

A matter is clearly erroneous, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in
UnitedStates v. US. Gypsum Corp., when "the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed."25 In Dickinson v. Zurko the U.S. Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed that clearly erroneous is less - not more deferential to the lower tribunal than substantial evidence. 6 Although
the Supreme Court reversed the lower opinion for misreading the
review requirements of the APA, in Zurko the Federal Circuit observed
that in contrast to arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence,
2333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
26119 S.Ct. 1816, 1818 (1999) ("Traditionally this court/court standard of review

[clearly erroneous] has been considered somewhat stricter (i.e., allowing somewhat closer
judicial review) than the APA's court/agency standards [substantial evidence and arbitrary and
capricious].").
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which require the reviewing body to consider lower tribunal decisions
on the reasoning provided below, clearly erroneous requires a
reviewing body to consider the lower tribunal's decision on the
reviewing body's own reasoning.2
The interpretation of the clearly erroneous standard of review
by the Federal Circuit in Zurko provides an accepted and useful test for
courts reviewing ALJ final orders. It is also consistent with application
of clearly erroneous outside of the agency context. According to
Wright & Miller, in applying clearly erroneous to review of a jury
findings (including jury verdicts) in criminal cases, courts will reverse
[i]f the findings [by the lower court] ... are against the
clear weight of the evidence or [if] the appellate court
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made, . . . even though there is
evidence [supporting the findings] that, by itself, would
be substantial.28
The rationale for the distinction between substantial evidence,
applicable to review of juries, and clearly erroneous, applicable to
review of findings by judges, has been stated as follows:
The judges [of both trial and appellate] courts are drawn
from the same section of the populace. Except for the
difference in numbers, one is no more representative of
the community than the other. To the extent a group of
men [sic] is more representative than a single person,
the appellate court resembles the jury more than does
the trial court. And both groups of men [sic] are skilled
in the same field, neither ordinarily being specialists in
anything but the law. Inasmuch as the appellate courts
occupy a superior position in the judicial hierarchy, the
appellate judges are certainly no less expert and able
than the trial judges. And the decisions of the appellate
27142 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
289 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §2585.
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courts have the advantage of the collaboration and
interchange of ideas of three or more men [sic].29
Thus, because trial court and appellate court judges share similar
institutional capacities, there is no institutional reason why an appellate
court should give the trial judge's findings of fact greater weight than
legal conclusions. An appellate court applying clearly erroneous will
reverse "ifit is convinced in its own mind that the finding below is
unquestionably wrong, even if a reasonable man might have made it."3
In terms of their institutional capacity, ALJs occupy a position
similar to trial judges. In reviewing ALJ final orders, instead of
accepting the ALJ's reasoning, which may jeopardize agency
accountability, a reviewing court can substitute the agency's reasoning
for the ALJ's under the clearly erroneous standard.
If courts can apply the test in a principled way, application of
the clearly erroneous test in lieu of substantial evidence could help
restore some of the accountability that is lost with central panel ALJ
final orders. However, as many commentators - including Judge
Leventhal and the U.S. Supreme Court - have suggested, there may
be no difference in outcomes between the two tests when applied to
issues of fact. 3 To the extent the clearly erroneous test further confuses
courts, introduces new levels of judicial error, or does not differ

9

Robert L. Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators,Judges and Juries: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 58 HARV. L. REv. 70, 82 (1944).
3
°Od. at 89.
3
See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 448 F.2d 1127,
1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Judge Leventhal, speculating that he may have found the "case dreamed
of by law professors," but later concluding no difference in outcome between clearly erroneous

and substantial evidence). In Zurko, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "the difference

[between substantial evidence and clearly erroneous] is a subtle one - so fine that (apart from
the present case) we have failed to find a single instance in which a reviewing court conceded
that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome."
119 S.Ct. at 1823. According to Frank Cooper, a draftsman of the 1961 MSAPA: "if the
appellant can convince the appellate court that the administrative finding of facts is obviously
just plain wrong, and if the appellant at the same time can arouse the court with a zealous
desire to correct the error, the court can always find means to do so, whatever labels must be
applied." Frank E. Cooper, AdministrativeLaw: The "SubstantialEvidence" Rule, 44 ABA
J. 945, 947 (1958).
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significantly from substantial evidence in outcome, the gains of a
clearly erroneous standard of review to issues of fact may not justify its
costs. Appellate courts can probably minimize their decisionmaking
costs by applying substantial evidence to ALJ findings of fact. As I
shall suggest, however, the method of inquiry of the clearly erroneous
standard of review may have more practical relevance when appellate
courts are reviewing policy and legal decisions in final ALJ orders.
C.

Issues of Policy

Where ALJ final orders do not focus on issues that can be
resolved based on credibility of witnesses and other evidence, deviating
from substantial evidence can help preserve agency accountability. For
example, in deciding issues of policy, unlike issues of fact, the ALJ is
not concerned exclusively with the credibility of witnesses or other
evidence. Not all policy judgements are of the sort that evidence alone
can resolve; some are judgments that will depend for their legitimacy
on a degree of political accountability. In addition, broader policy and
regulatory goals may be implemented by an individualized policy
judgment, so it will often be important to evaluate the relationship
between the individual decision and the agency's other programs.
On issues of policy, something important is lost if the ALJ's
decision trumps the agency's without providing the agency an
opportunity to make the final decision. For example, if a system where
the ALJ makes final decisions is in place, an ALJ evaluating wetland
mitigation associated with the siting of a transmission line can rely on
the admissible evidence the ALJ finds most credible and convincing.
The ALJ can make policy decisions regarding what kinds of wetlands
are important, and if the ALJ had final order authority these final
decisions will then be reviewed by an appellate court without allowing
the agency more than an opportunity to participate as a litigant in the
adjudicative proceeding. The ALJ might decide that herbaceous
wetlands are somehow equivalent to forested wetlands. Yet this is a
policy issue that depends on broader state environmental protection
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goals.32
From an accountability perspective, allowing a central panel
ALJ to trump the agency on such an issue is problematic. Central panel
ALJs often operate within the executive branch, but they are generally
nonpolitical. Unlike the agency, which has substantive regulatory
jurisdiction, the central panel has not been delegated the authority to
regulate in a specialized area. Agency heads, unlike most ALJs, are
political appointees, accountable (through appointments and removal,
as well as budgetary oversight) to the executive branch and - perhaps
to a lesser, but no less important, degree - the legislature (which writes
and amends regulatory statutes). The political accountability of agency
heads is important to ensuring the public legitimacy of agency action.
Advocates of central panel final order authority may respond
with two arguments supporting reviewing court deference to ALJs. Yet
neither argument is convincing to those who value political
accountability in the agency decisionmaking process.
First, advocates of deference to ALJ final orders may argue that
the agency has had the opportunity to decide policy issues prior to
hearing, and that it is inefficient and biased towards the agency to allow
agencies any advantage over other litigants later in the process.
However, when agencies take positions on matters of policy prior to
hearing, their explanations in support of these positions are often not as
rigorous and developed as they would be after hearing occurs. As a
practical matter, the agency head may not make pre-hearing decisions.
Instead, pre-hearing agency decisions are often made by lower-level
staff and not fully churned through the ranks of the agency and its
experts. Further, because a hearing has not yet occurred and private
litigants may be reluctant to fully "put on their case" prior to formal
adjudication, the initial agency decision is often made based on more
limited information than would be the case if all evidence were before
the agency head. As to issues of policy, the agency must have the
opportunity to fully develop and vet its rationales in order to allow the
"The problem posed here draws from the facts of Florida Power Corporation v.
Department of Environmental Protection, 638 So.2d 545 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1994).

Fall 1999

ALJ Final Orders on Appeal

agency the opportunity to put forth the best explanation for a reviewing
court and to ensure its policy choices are legitimate in the eyes of those
it regulates and the legislature that oversees its activities. And, as to
issues of law, the agency's fully developed explanation of its legal
interpretation can also work to legitimize agency action below. Yet, if
the AL's decisions on issues of issues of policy or law are final, fully
developed explanations may only be made in appellate briefs.
Second, advocates of ALJ final order authority may claim that
the AU is as capable as the agency head at making technical
judgments on expert matters. Insofar as pure issues of fact are
concerned, expertise may be nothing more than the credibility of
competing agency and non-agency experts, and the AU will be able to
contribute neutrality and efficiency to the resolution of such issues by
evaluating evidence, witness demeanor, and cross-examination. In the
central panel context, however, most ALJs are generalists, more like a
trial judge than an agency member.33 Further, on many issues,
including issues of environmental science, judgments about competing
policy or technical models often must be made. The agency head is in
a better position than the AU to determine whether an individualized
policy or technical judgment fits with the agency's broader policy
agenda. Expertise depends for its legitimacy not just on credible factual
findings or expert opinions, but on judgment and accountability for
judgment.
These arguments against deference to AU final orders on issues
of policy may not be convincing to those who doubt the political
legitimacy of executive power and agencies within the executive
branch. But to the extent we are committed to the principle that the
executive branch should play an active role in modem governance, we
may get more accountable executive decisionmaking if we give weight
to the policy decision made by the executive branch agency responsible
for implementing the statute or regulatory program as the independent
ALJ.

33
An internal agency ALJ, who hears the same issues over and over again, such as
an AL at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, may have a claim to technical expertise
that is equal to a member of the agency.
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In final orders, ALJs issue independent decisions about matters
of policy, based on the credibility of witnesses and other evidence.
However, accountability is sacrificed if courts simply defer to the ALJ,
taking away the agency's opportunity to put its best foot forward after
hearing and turning expertise into nothing but a contest over the
credibility of experts. On review, the court may need to apply some
version of the arbitrary and capricious test, evaluating the quality of
reasoning below.
In doing so, however, the court should accept the agency's
reasoning framework, not the AL's. While effectively this is what the
clearly erroneous standard would allow a court to do, I am not
advocating application of a clearly erroneous standard of review to
issues ofpolicy. Instead, I am suggesting that the theoretical distinction
between substantial evidence and clearly erroneous is helpful in
defining how courts should review ALJ final orders on issues of policy;
when reviewing issues policy in final ALJ orders, appellate courts
should borrow from the clearly erroneous method of inquiry,
substituting the agency's reasoning framework for the AL's. In
reviewing ALJ final orders, it is the relevant reasoning framework,
rather than the level of deference, that is most important in defining the
scope of the court's inquiry for issues of policy. In reviewing issues of
policy, the agency's reasoning framework should trump the AL's or
that of any competing expert witness. Beyond this, a court generally
should apply a level of deference consistent with the other standards of
review it applies in the jurisdiction, taking into account that
independence and accountability are more likely to diverge in the
decisionmakers below when issues of policy are appealed.
D.

Findings of Law

As with issues of policy, on issues of law the independent
decisionmaker is not the same as the politically accountable
decisionmaker. Because political accountability is a primary value in
rendering legal interpretations of statutes and rules, some level of
deference to the politically accountable decisionmaker is the
appropriate standard of review.
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In the states, courts take a variety of approaches to reviewing
issues of law. Some courts give agencies and ALJs no deference,
instead reviewing all issues of law de novo. For example, in California,
courts have exercised "independent judgement" in reviewing agency
legal interpretations.34 A failed 1999 Florida reform proposal would
have amended its APA to state "judges hearing appeals of agency rules
shall not defer, or otherwise give any special weight, to an agency's
interpretation of a law or a rule.""
De novo review requires a court to effectively re-interpret the
same statute the lower tribunal has applied. In terms of efficiency and
accountability, this approach has little to commend. From an efficiency
perspective, the court is asked to independently engage in the
interpretive analysis a lower tribunal has already made, based on the
arguments raised before it. From an accountability perspective, agency
heads are more institutionally competent than state court judges in
interpreting statutes. Although many state court judges are elected,
agency heads are closer to the regulatory problems, have more
expertise, and are more accountable to the legislature for their
interpretations of statutes and regulations.
Recognizing the importance of political accountability in
deciding issues of law, many courts apply one of the two deference
approaches explicitly rejected by Florida's recent reform proposal.
Some courts apply a "deference lite" approach, also known as Skidmore
deference, giving greater weight to the agency's interpretation vis-a-vis
alternative interpretations.36 Still other courts apply a variation of the
Chevron test, interpreting de novo "clear and unambiguous" statutory
language, but deferring to agency interpretations that are subject to
'Asimow, supra note 21, at 1193.
3
See prefiled Fla. HB 107 (amending Fla. Stat. § 120.68(7) (d)). Although Florida's
APA was amended in 1999, this provision was not included in the APA amendments that were
signed into law.
3
The degree of weight may "depend on the thoroughness evident in its [the
agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking power
to control." Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The approach is used in many
states. See William A. McGrath, et al., Project: State JudicialReview ofAdministrative Action,
43 ADMIN. L.REV. 571, 768-70 (1991).
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more than one meaning." Often, at the level of step-two deference
under the Chevron test, an arbitrary and capricious test is also applied
to the agency's reasoning process.
When a court is reviewing a final ALJ order, however, the
rationales for applying traditional deference standards of review to a
lower tribunal's statutory interpretation are inapposite. One of the
primary reasons for giving weight to the agency interpretation or
deferring to the agency is enhanced accountability, to the extent the
agency is responsible for enforcing the statutory scheme. Yet,
deference to an ALJ final order on issues of statutory interpretation
risks undermining agency accountability, particularly where the ALJ
and agency do not agree on the merits of a policy choice or statutory
meaning. Here, independence and accountability are in sharp tension.
As an alternative to deference to the ALJ, in reviewing final
ALJ orders courts should modify the traditional rules of deference to
lower tribunal statutory interpretation. At a minimum, reviewing courts
should give strong weight to the agency's interpretation of law,
regardless of how the ALJ has decided the legal issue. From an
accountability perspective, the deference approach has much to
commend, so long as reviewing courts defer to the agency - not the
ALJ - on issues of law in final ALJ orders. Again, a clearly erroneous
type of inquiry may be of some use for reviewing courts, especially if
they substitute the reasoning framework of the agency's statutory
interpretation for the AL's.
IV.

Conclusion

ALJ finality raises a problem on judicial review because
independence and accountability do not always converge in the
decisionmaker whose order is subject to review. In enhancing the final
order authority of ALJs, state legislatures have consistently failed to
address this problem. There are many ways to enhance the

"Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
According to a 1990 study, eleven states had adopted tests that bear similarity to strong
Chevron deference. McGrath, et al., supra note 36, at 763-66.
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accountability of a central panel, among them allowing the central panel
the full discretion a trial court has to write opinions. However, in
context of judicial review of agency decisionmaking, political
accountability also needs to be protected. Appellate courts have ways
of balancing independence and accountability in standards of review.
When state APAs take away this opportunity by defining a standard of
review that requires either independent judgement by the reviewing
court or strong deference to the ALJ's final decision on nonfactual
issues, we risk turning our administrative judiciary into a
To protect accountability,
constitutionally suspect institution.
reviewing courts need to carefully evaluate the level of deference they
apply to ALJ final orders on issues of law and policy.

